Anti-Doping Crusade Out Of Control

The Mayo case. How many more times? Laboratorie National de Depistage du Dopage (LNDD) located in Chatenay-Malabry, France, a World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) accredited lab used for Tour de France doping testing declares Mr. Iban Mayo EPO "positive" then rushes off to holiday without bothering to follow up with a mandatory "B" confirmation test. The Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) sends the sample off to a lab at the University of Ghent in Belge. The Ghent lab finds a "non-negative" EPO result. To be quite sure of their findings Ghent asks EPO doping experts in Australia to provide a second opinion. The Australian lab cannot be certain of the presence of EPO in the Mayo sample. The UCI decides to return the sample to the Laboratorie National de Depistage du Dopage (LNDD) for a second "B" re-test. Anne Gripper, UCI drug czarina is so confident that the "non-negative" finding is in error she declares LNDD to be the single WADA accredited lab in the world where "a positive can be found." Right on Anne! You have charted new territory in anti-doping detection by ordering a second "B" confirmation test, one done at the University of Ghent and a second done at LNDD. Why? Because two accredited WADA labs cannot replicate LNDD's findings, but LNDD will!

Well alright, we have an old pattern developing here. Floyd Landis had a similar problem. LNDD was in a hurry to finish the Landis "B" sample Carbon Isotope Ratio (IRMS) so they could go on holiday. Perhaps LNDD lab workers were in such a hurry to leave town that nobody noticed that people who worked on the "A" sample also worked on the "B" sample. Interesting because LNDD had run into problems with lab personnel working on "A" and "B" samples before. The issue was contested in a Court of Arbitration of Sport (CAS) hearing known as the Landaluce case. The Landaluce CAS decision expressly forbade the same people working on both "A" and "B" samples because of the obvious incentive of these people to replicate their own work. The case against Landaluce was dismissed. The CAS cited a blatant disregard for WADA International Standards for Laboratories (ISL) which prohibits lab personnel from working on both samples. Perhaps LNDD lab administration did not understand implications of Landaluce and possible ramifications involved in the Floyd Landis case. Or more likely due to the cloaked nature of doping arbitration hearings, presumption, and lack of scrutiny of laboratory procedures Jacques de Ceaurriz simply did not care. After all, if a Adverse Analytical Finding resulted there would probably never be any discussion of who worked on what. This fanciful notion was almost realised. Floyd Landis and his legal team had to fight tooth and nail in discovery hearings and only because of intense public pressure did USADA and Travis T. Tygart admit to the truth. Nevertheless, LNDD has now acquired a well deserved reputation of being unable to learn from their own mistakes. It is ironic that the issue of lab personnel working on both samples will be at issue in the Landis CAS appeal. Does anyone at LNDD read technical documents or CAS rulings? Do they care?

Travis T. Tygart, UCI, and WADA hated the Landaluce decision. But Tygart had too much at stake. The AAA Majority could be counted on to ignore the CAS ruling in the Landis case because in the strange world of arbitration, rules can be made up at random and precedent need not be followed. But Tygart feared that his perfect record in doping arbitration hearings was in jeopardy because of a stupid blunder by LNDD. So the simplest remedy was to end run Landaluce by convincing the North American Court of Arbitration of Sport (AAA) to allow additional "B" IRMS of Floyd Landis. The Panel agreed to the additional tests with the stipulation that no new Adverse Analytical Findings (AAF) could be filed on the results because WADA International Standards for Laboratories (ISL) prohibited them without a "A" IRMS. However, as Chris Campbell argued in his dissent, the Panel Majority could "cherry pick" evidence that would support the Stage 17 Adverse Analytical Finding. Mr. Landis wanted the testing done at UCLA, the finest WADA accredited lab in the world. The UCLA lab was run by Don Catlin an internationally respected researcher into doping detection. But Travis T. Tygart refused to allow the IRMS tests to be done at UCLA. The fear? LNDD results would not be verified by UCLA. Therefore, his argument that doping had occurred during other stages of the race would have no merit. Landaluce would be upheld, LNDD would be exposed as a lab that does not learn from mistakes, a lab that has a disregard for WADA code, a lab that produces results that cannot be replicated by any other lab. In a panic Catlin disabled the UCLA IRMS to satisfy the concerns of Tygart. The samples were shipped thousands of miles under unknown conditions to Paris. When the additional IRMS "B" tests were being conducted, LNDD and the United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) prevented Mr. Landis' representative Mr. Scott Davis from witnessing some IRMS lab procedures. Of course, exclusion of a rider or his representative from any sample testing is a violation of WADA code and could be construed as interfering in the anti-doping process. In fact, many observers of the Landis case still insist that Mr. Davis was excluded in order for LNDD to "dry lab" testing. This consists of reporting findings without doing any lab work. A carefully prepared LDP done in advance to confirm "doping."

Campbell could be considered a very perceptive man. In a secret behind-closed-door-hearing the Panel and Franceso Botre examined a critical volume of evidence. This secret volume apparently contained Lab Document Packages (LDP) of IRMS and testosterone/epitestosterone ratios (T/E), all stages, of urine samples provided by Mr. Landis. This testing was allowed because after urine samples are provided for testing technically they are considered property of the UCI. Botre, head of the WADA Rome Lab, essentially acted as a de-facto fourth Panel member clearly supportive of LNDD and WADA interests. The results of this examination led to a dismissal of all of Mr. Landis' scientific points of contention in a weirdly written Majority decision of "cherry picked" evidence hidden from public view.

How does all of this apply to Iban Mayo? Anne Gripper the UCI anti-doping czarina was not satisfied with the University of Ghent "non-negative" Iban Mayo "B" sample. No indeed. This would convince people that LNDD is incapable of doing competent lab work; an obvious point demonstrated in Landis' WIKI defense. Also a "non-negative" would invalidate the LNDD "A" EPO positive result. Therefore, no further action could be taken against Mayo, because both "A" and "B" tests must be positive in order to file an Adverse Analytical Finding (AAF). The Spanish Cycling Federation declared the Mayo case closed. The UCI decided to attempt to over ride Spanish Cycling with an additional "B" test at LNDD hoping that LNDD would confirm the "A" sample positive result. The UCI obviously wants to present this positive "B" LNDD sample to CAS in order to force Spanish Cycling to conform to a CAS ruling and ban Mayo.

Not enough? Gripper also stated the "B" sample would go on at LNDD with or without Mayo or his representative. The UCI seems to have adopted USADA fever. Is a lab permitted to do any type of lab work without scrutiny, even if the result is interfering in the anti-doping process?

The CAS needs to stop this confusion. "A" samples by one lab may be refuted by "B" tests from other labs. Does the UCI have a right to conduct additional "B" tests at WADA accredited lab "A" to refute conclusions reached at WADA accredited lab "B"? What set of "B" results are considered a valid measure? How many "B" tests may be run to reach a desired outcome? Also, since the Landis case is headed for a CAS showdown it is imperative to set guidelines as to what sort and how many "B" tests a anti-doping authority should be able to run. Should USADA be allowed to order additional "B" IRMS when no "A" IRMS were run? Should USADA be allowed to order IRMS tests when the original "A" T/E tests were in a normal range? Should IRMS be run only when the "A" test indicates a possible testosterone spike? Or should IRMS be done at random throughout Grand Tour stages? The Court of Arbitration of Sport needs to resolve these issues once and for all, and then enforce the rules without exception.

The issue of the rider and his representative attending testing as provided for in WADA code should be written in stone and followed religiously.

In the Mayo case the Spanish Cycling Federation has ruled the Mayo case closed. The UCI should agree to this decision and stop trying to undermine national sovereignty in cycling licensing decisions.

Otherwise a very long and costly legal process will ensue.